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The “New” Quantitative History. Social Science or Old 
Wine in New Bottles? (1980) ∗ 
Jerome M. Clubb 
Much has been written and said in recent years of the emergence of a variety of 
“new” histories1. To the casual observer the diversity of the new histories may seem 
bewildering and even convey the impression of pretentious craving for the appear-
ance, but not the substance, of innovation. And, indeed, the new histories have pro-
voked substantial controversy and criticism on exactly those grounds. Yet even the 
most cursory examination of the recent literature suggests numerous departures 
from the preoccupations of traditional historiography. New themes are explored, 
new methods employed, new sources exploited and neglected social institutions 
examined in new ways. Some of the elitist bias that has long been a dominant char-
acteristic of historical research and writing has dissipated as historians have at-
tempted to use new sources to examine the conditions and behavior of the ordinary 
people of the past. Above all, perhaps, a growing number, but still a minority, of 
historians have made increased use of quantitative methods and tools. If there is a 
common denominator that cuts across the varieties of the new histories, it is quanti-
fication, and it is possible to speak with accuracy of the recent emergence of a 
quantitative form of historical inquiry. 
These new scholarly interests and endeavors have been marked by their fair 
share of false starts and mistaken directions. A cadre of curmudgeonly critics 
among historians, and even including a few practitioners of the other social sci-
ences, have decleared all such efforts barren, not history, and fated only to do vio-
lence of the literary values and the humane traditions of conventional historiogra-
phy. It is certainly true that claims for the new histories have sometimes been 
unduly exalted and that the new approaches to the study of the past have not yet 
produced the revolutionary new knowledge that their more optimistic and aggres-
sive proponents sometimes promised. Yet it is also true that these new efforts have 
already enriched historical studies. 
The purpose here, however, is not to detail or celebrate the characteristics, ac-
complishments and failures of each of the new histories. To do so would require a 
treatise of tiresome length. In any event, numerous “state of the art” essays con-
cerned in one way or the other with these new approaches to historical inquiry have 
appeared in recent years2. These essays, and the numerous works which they refer-
                                                             
∗  Reprint from: HSF Vol. 6 (1980), pp. 13-24. 
1  This paper draws upon two essays written in collaboration with Professor Allan G. Bogue 
and William H. Flanigan and published in American Behavioral Scientist, 21 (November/ 
December 1977). While the present paper profits greatly from their erudition and insights, 
neither of them is responsible for errors of fact, judgment or interpretation which it may in-
clude. 
2  See, for example, Bogue, Allan G. (ed.), Emerging Theoretical Models in Social and Politi-
cal History, in: American Behavioral Scientist, 16 (May/June 1973); Bogue, Allan G., and 
Clubb, Jerome (eds.), History and the Social Sciences: Progress and Prospects, in: Ameri-
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ence, amply demonstrate both the diversity and the vitality of the new histories. The 
goals of the present essay are different and more modest. It is concerned with quan-
titative approaches to historical inquiry primarily as practiced by historians in the 
United States and, in the first instance, with progress toward the emergence of a 
social scientific history — or, more properly, with progress toward a form of his-
torical inquiry devoted to the development of scientific knowledge of human behav-
ior. A second concern is with obstacles that lie in the way of a form of historical 
inquiry so conceived and motivated. 
The “New” Quantitative History 
Tables, graphs, charts and even elaborate statistical formulations have become 
common elements in the research reports of historians. Quantification has become 
an accepted, although by no means universally welcomed, element of the historical 
discipline. The use of quantitative methods and materials by historians has opened 
the way for forward steps in the advancement of historical knowledge; major con-
tributions to historical knowledge that rest in critical ways on the application of 
quantitative tools and materials can be cited; and the use of those tools and materi-
als has resulted in a literature that often appears quite unlike the product of more 
conventional historical research. 
In view of these obvious manifestations of change within the historical discipline 
it may seem remarkable that, from many perspectives, the most striking develop-
ments in historical inquiry have come not from professional historians but from 
scholars outside the discipline. And here, perhaps to betray a parochial bias, recent 
comparative studies of political and societal change — whether termed moderniza-
tion, development or described under some other rubric — that sweep broadly 
across both modern history and the contemporary era might be particularly singled 
out3. The ultimate value of the theoretical and conceptual formulations that have 
emerged from such studies is surely questionable, but it is certainly the case that 
they cast the politics and society of the past in new perspective, point new direc-
tions for historical research, and call into doubt long-accepted explanations of his-
torical events. They attempt as well to present an integrated view of politics and 
society that is often — perhaps usually — missing from the work of historians. 
The historical studies conducted by social scientists are remarkable enough in 
their own right. Two considerations seem more remarkable. One is the fact that so-
cial scientists have not placed greater reliance upon the work of historians but have 
tended instead to develop their own form of historical inquiry. A second and, for 
present purposes, more important consideration is the reactions of historians to 
these studies, at least in the United States, and including many quantitative histori-
ans. For many historians, both “new” and otherwise, the scope of such largescale 
                                                                                                                                
can Behavioral Scientist, 21 (November/December 1977); and Lorwin, Val R., and Price, 
Jacob M. (eds.), The Dimension of the Past: Materials, Problems and Opportunities for 
Quantitative Work in History, New Haven 1972. See also Swierenga, Robert P., Computers 
and American History: The Impact of the ‘New’ Generation, in: The Journal of American 
History, 60 (March 1974); and The New Political History: Progress and Prospects, in: 
Computers and the Humanities, 11 (September/October 1977). 
3  This is not to overlook the pioneering work of such historians as Cyril E. Black. 
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comparative studies seems monumental, even grandiose. Critical relations seem to 
be merely assumed rather than demonstrated; conceptual and theoretical formula-
tions seem excessively abstract and mechanistic and not easily operationalized in 
terms of historical data. Above all, perhaps, such studies seem to play too fast and 
loose with chronology and to lack the rich sense of time, place and specific context 
to which historians are accustomed. Seemingly disparate phenomena are classified, 
lumped together and compared apparently with little regard for temporal order or 
historical context. These considerations suggest differences in orientation between 
historians, on the one hand, and social scientists who use the past as a source of 
evidence, on the other. They suggest, as well, that history, even quantitative history, 
has moved only a little way in the direction of social science. 
The basis of these differences and their significance can be partially elucidated 
by brief consideration of the genesis of quantitative approaches to historical inquiry. 
It is frequently suggested that quantitative history is characterized by a marked af-
finity with the related social sciences and that, indeed, these new approaches grew 
out of the social sciences. In fact, affinity with the social sciences is clear and ex-
plicit in terms of the use of quantitative techniques and source materials. An affinity 
is also present, but substantially less explicit and less clear, where conceptual and 
theoretical formulations are concerned. But the new quantitative history can also 
and perhaps more accurately be seen as a product of basic canons of traditional his-
torical method. To a considerable degree, the new use of quantitative techniques 
and source materials grew out of the traditional historiographical requirement that 
all source materials and all relevant methods be used to gain the most detailed, 
complete, and objective view possible of past events, personages and situations. Put 
differently, the use of new techniques and source materials has meant no necessary 
deviation from the goal of traditional historiography — to describe and reconstruct 
the past “as it actually happened”. Neither does that use involve necessarily a depar-
ture from the methodological assumptions of traditional historiography, nor does it 
necessarily look directly toward development of scientific knowledge of human 
affairs. 
These considerations may help to explain some of the characteristics of early 
applications of quantitative techniques and materials by historians. In general, quan-
titative historians did not escape the tendency to focus research upon limited his-
torical episodes and problems. That tendency in turn also worked, of course, to 
promote an excessively compartmentalized and static view of human affairs. If any-
thing, moreover, the higher costs of research using quantitative data and methods, 
as compared with more conventional approaches, led initially to concern for even 
more narrow and more limited research topics and to heavier emphasis upon case 
studies. Thus the findings produced by much of the early work were of limited or, 
at best, unknown generality. This is not to issue a blanket indictment of the case 
study approach. It is to say, however, that the early view — that multiplication of 
case studies in the absence of comparable methods and data and without theory 
would lead to general findings — was fallacious. 
A more serious legacy of traditional historiography was in the areas of concept 
and theory. As David Potter observed in 1963: 
Orthodox or formal historical method was shaped at a time when men believed that a 
body of data would reveal its own meaning and would interpret itself, if only it were 
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valid or authentic and were arranged in time sequence. The central problem of me-
thod, therefore, was to validate the data rather than to interpret them. Hence the prob-
lem of historical interpretation was neglected; indeed its very existence as a problem 
was denied at the theoretical level, and the principal questions which the problem of 
interpretation ought to have posed were left to nonhistorians. Thus the problem of 
causation has been left to the philosophers; the problem of human motivation has 
been left to psychologists; the problem of social organization has been left to the so-
ciologists.4 
Thus valid understanding of historical events, processes and persons could be 
gained simply by consulting all relevant sources — or, through “emersion in the 
sources” as it is still often put. Causal relations were seen as self-evident or asserted 
on the basis of intuition; human attitudes and motivation were also seen as self-
evident or identifiable essentially through processes of empathy. Interpretation, sys-
tematic theory and generalization were unnecessary. To a considerable degree the 
early quantitative historians retained these views and assumptions, and it is by no 
means the case that they have yet entirely disappeared. 
The impact of these assumptions was readily observable in much of the early 
work of quantitative historians. Energy was invested in acquiring conversance with 
the tools of quantification. Emphasis was placed, however, on techniques of data 
analysis, and for many data analysis was apparently simply an alternative means to 
“emersion in the sources”. But despite investment of energy, familiarity with tech-
niques of data analysis was usually gained through self-training and in essentially 
“cookbook” fashion. Outside the field of economic history, neither training oppor-
tunities, the curriculum in history, nor the structure of professional rewards were 
such as to encourage acquisition of meaningful formal training in mathematics and 
related areas. The consequence was that the properties of statistical procedures were 
often not fully understood with the further result that all too frequently applications 
of those procedures were naive and erroneous. 
Too little attention was directed to problems of conceptualization, measurement 
and inference. It was not fully recognized that selection of appropriate statistical 
models requires conceptualization of the historical processes and phenomena of 
concern. In the absence of that conceptualization, inappropriate statistical models 
were frequently applied. Much of the early work of quantitative historians involved 
a marked tendency to, in effect, “reify” empirical data and to treat empirical data as 
effectively synonymous with underlying concepts. The measurement gap — the gap 
between data and concept — was overlooked. Thus voting records were sometimes 
treated as direct measures of mass partisan attitudes or popular policy preferences, 
occupational or educational characteristics were taken as straightforward indica-
tions of social status or position, and change in such characteristics was taken as a 
direct measure of social mobility. The need for conceptualization — for auxiliary 
theory — to link data to concept was not recognized. Causal inferences were often 
                                                             
4  Potter, David M., Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions in Historical Study, in: 
Gottschalk, Louis (ed.), Generalizations in the Writing of History: A Report of the Commit-
tee on Historical Analysis of the Social Science Research Council, Chicago 1963. 
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drawn, asserted and refuted, but without adequate empirical warrant or test and 
without theoretical justification5. 
The early forays into quantification, in short, did not free historians from the as-
sumption of nineteenth century “scientific” historiography that data are somehow 
self-interpreting. Like their more conventional colleagues, quantitative historians 
tended to be essentially atheoretical, although important exceptions could be cited. 
It was not, of course, that theoretical formulations and generalizations were absent 
from their work. In fact, the actual structure of explanation in numerous quantitative 
historical works was provided, not by historical sources, but by generalizations and 
theories — by “covering laws” — drawn from common sense, personal philosophy, 
ideology, or an obsolete social science. Indeed, without these generalizations and 
theoretical formulations, meaningful and explanations of historical events could not 
have been constructed6. These formulations, however, were usually implicit and 
untested and were seldom subjected to self-conscious and critical examination. 
The new economic, or “cliometric”, history — theoretically and mathematically 
the most elegant and advanced of the new histories — was a partial exception. In 
this area neo-classical economic theory was explicitly and rigorously employed as a 
basis for estimation and measurement, to interpret and “make sense” of historical 
data, and to resolve long-contested questions in economic history. On the other 
hand, neoclassical theory was primarily used to explain the phenomena of the past; 
substantially less attention was directed to using the data of the past to extend, test 
and refine economic theory7. 
Substantial progress has been made in many of these respects. Greater attention 
is now given to matters of representation. The case study approach is less com-
monly employed, and historians less frequently claim generality for findings based 
upon case studies. Proficiency in the use of analytical techniques has grown, and an 
increasing number of historians have benefitted from formal training in the tools 
and methods of quantitative inquiry. In the use of these tools historians have be-
come more sophisticated and subtle, and at least passing concern is directed to 
problems of measurement. Thus it is possible to speak of the emergence of a new 
history. Historians now attempt to gain a more complete view of the past; they are 
more comprehensive in their use of source material; and they are no longer satisfied 
with a history that merely recounts the doings of the few of power and position of 
the past. Rather historians have devoted greater attention to the ordinary men and 
women of the past, to basic but neglected social institutions, and to events and con-
ditions at the “grass roots”. 
But if we speak of central tendencies, this is a history that remains primarily 
dedicated to traditional historiographical goals. While historians have become more 
                                                             
5  For a discussion of one illustration of these problems see Clubb, Jerome M., and Allen, 
Howard W., Collective Biography and the Progressive Movement: The ‘Status Revolution’ 
Revisited, in: Social Science History, 1 (Summer 1977). 
6  The point of view expressed here draws upon Hempel, C. G., The Function of General 
Laws in History, in: Gardiner, Patrick (ed.), Theories of History, Glencoe/ Ill. 1959; Mur-
phey, Murray G., Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, Indianapolis/ Ind. 1973; and Pot-
ter, Explicit Data and Implicit Assumptions. 
7  See North, Douglass C., The New Economic History after Twenty Years, in: American 
Behavioral Scientist, 21 (November/ December 1977). 
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attuned to the related social sciences, their use of generalization and theory is still 
largely implicit and uncritical, and the role of theory and generalization in historical 
explanation is as yet only partially recognized. The quantitative work of historians 
is primarily concerned with specific episodes and events which are selected for ex-
amination on the basis of their intrinsic historical interest. In the main, the goal of 
quantitative historians is to reconstruct and describe the past “as it actually hap-
pened”, and reconstruction and description of past events is taken as an end in itself. 
On the other hand, substantially less in the way of systematic and self-conscious 
effort is directed to using the evidence of the past to develop generalizations and to 
refine and construct theoretical formulations. Whether pursued in quantitative or 
other ways, these goals and efforts fall short of social science and do not promise to 
fully realize the potentiality of historical inquiry as a means to contribute to scien-
tific knowledge of human affairs. 
It may well be that recognition of the value of quantitative methods and materi-
als as tools of historical inquiry will lead to reorientation of the historical discipline 
in social scientific directions. Quantification is not, however, the only attribute of 
science. As yet, the use of quantitative methods and materials has led few histori-
ans, to use Charles Tilly’s words, “quite outside history, in[to] that timeless realm 
in which situations, persons, or events plucked from the past or the present serve as 
tests of general statements about social life.”8 A new quantitative history has 
emerged, but that history carries us only a little way toward contribution to the de-
velopment of scientific knowledge of human affairs. 
This is not to say, of course, that all historians will, or should, pursue social sci-
entific goals. The effort to develop valid and reliable descriptions and explanations 
of historical events is obviously a laudable intellectual enterprise in its own right. 
Indeed, valid and reliable reconstruction of past events and situations would be a 
vital component of social scientific historical inquiry. It is to say, however, that his-
torical inquiry dedicated to scientific ends would require a further and more radical 
transformation than quantitative, or other, historians have yet accomplished. It is 
also to say that because of the central and necessary role of generalization and the-
ory in historical explanation, elements of that transformation are required if more 
valid and reliable reconstruction of past events is to be achieved. 
Problems of Historical Data 
Aspects of the required transformation, and broad characteristics of the form of his-
torical studies that would be its consequence, can be readily recognized if the goals 
and limitations of the contemporary social sciences are considered. A central goal 
of the social sciences is to identify regularities in human affairs and to develop em-
pirically refutable theoretical formulations which link together and explain those 
regularities. In the pursuit of this goal, however, the social sciences are constrained 
by sharply limited capacity to experiment where human beings are concerned. To 
compensate for these limitations, social scientists have recognized the necessity of 
examining and comparing social phenomena in a variety of situational contexts, and 
                                                             
8  Tilly, Charles, Quantification in History, As Seen From France, in: Lorwin, The Dimension 
of the Past, p. 108. 
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attention is devoted to comparative studies across nations, cultures, regions and 
subnational groups. The past affords an opportunity to extend these efforts and to 
examine a wider variety of human behavior in a wider variety of contexts. 
Viewed in these terms, the past can be used to formulate hypotheses and to test 
those based upon investigation of contemporary phenomena, to examine develop-
mental processes, to systematically trace trends and change over time, and to iden-
tify the determinants of societal change. The task of a genuinely social scientific 
historian would be to use the past to construct empirical social theory rather than to 
merely use social theory to describe and explain specific events of the past. To do 
so effectively, however, would require that historians give greater attention to the 
epistemological bases and limitations of their work. Greater and more serious atten-
tion to matters of method would also be required and not merely to matters of tech-
nique but to broader issues of measurement, design, conceptualization and inference 
as well. In their teaching and research historians would devote less attention to the 
specific facts and episodes of history and more to interpretation and theory. Sub-
stantial attention might also be directed to classification of historical and contempo-
rary events, processes, institutions and populations in terms of properties relevant to 
particular theoretical formulations. By the same token, specific events and phenom-
ena would be investigated not for their intrinsic historical interest but in terms of 
their relevance to theoretical concerns. 
But even if reorientations of this sort are both possible and desirable, critical 
problems are encountered. To a considerable degree these problems relate to the 
characteristics and limitations of historical source materials, and, it is worth noth-
ing, these problems are equally severe where achievement of the goals of traditional 
historiography are concerned. Indeed, in view of the gravity of these problems it is 
legitimate to ask whether historical inquiry can ever be any more than a tincture of 
empirical evidence combined with bits of useful theory and mixed with large ele-
ments of impression, surmise and empathetic understanding. 
The source materials upon which historians must rely are virtually by definition 
“process-produced.” It is true that historians occasionally have at their disposal data 
that were collected by social scientists to serve the purpose of social scientific re-
search. As the specious present slides imperceptably into the historical past, we can 
imagine that historians will turn to the rich sample survey data now being relig-
iously collected and maintained by social science data archives. But we can also 
imagine that historians in the future will regard these data as no less process-
produced — produced in this case by the process of social research as archaically 
practiced in the mid-twentieth century — and will bemoan the fact that the wrong 
data were collected, the wrong questions asked, and that underlying assumptions 
and methods were not better documented. 
The central difficulty where process-produced data are concerned is, of course, 
that the data were not collected, compiled and preserved with the needs of research-
ers in mind. Rather they are simply the byproducts of ongoing social, governmental 
and economic processes. Historical process-produced data involve additional com-
plexities for these are data that have been filtered and winnowed by the processes of 
time. Historical research, in other words, is limited not only to data — and informa-
tion about data — that was once collected but also to data and information that have 
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survived. Historical data, in other words, are the residual process-produced data that 
have survived the ravages of time. 
In their work historians sometimes confront an embarrassment of riches but most 
frequently their research must be conducted below the data poverty line. For a few 
problems, relevant data are voluminous indeed, and their effective use would in-
volve a truly monumental data collection and processing effort. For most problems, 
however, data are at best incomplete, and for vast areas of historical concern data 
are virtually nonexistent. Aside from a few treasure troves, for example, data that 
bear on mass attitudes in the past do not exist, and statements in this area must be 
based on often dubious inferences from behavioral data. 
Historians, of course, give great thought and attention to their sources. Indeed, 
source criticism is a central element of traditional historical methods. But conven-
tional source criticism carries us only a little way. External source criticism is con-
cerned with assessment of the authenticity of sources; internal criticism involves 
examination of texts to identify error, misrepresentation and inconsistency. A sys-
tematic historical inquiry that attempts to conform to scientific canons of verifica-
tion and explanation requires much more knowledge of the nature and properties of 
sources and data. 
Murray Murphey is one of the few historians who has devoted systematic atten-
tion to the characteristics of historical data and to the methods available for their 
use. He singles out five methodological problems that result from the characteris-
tics9 of historical data. While these problems could be summarized in various ways, 
Murphey’s discussion is both succinct and useful. The first of these is the problem 
of quantity which was just alluded to. The second is the problem of aggregation. 
Historical data are frequently available at a level of aggregation that is inappropriate 
to research concerns. In the most usual case, data are available in the form of sum-
mary measures or indices or as aggregated values for population groups and geo-
graphical units. It is not, of course, that summary measures and aggregated data are 
useless for many of the purposes of research. In fact, such data are frequently useful 
indeed. It is only that a variety of research problems require disaggregated data. A 
third problem is that of sampling. Most — in a sense all — historical data are in-
complete and can be seen as samples from total universes. In most cases, however, 
neither the properties of the universe nor of the sample are known. Murphey de-
scribes a fourth problem as that of “informant bias” which, put simply, is the prob-
lem of the reliability and, unlike contemporary social scientists, the historian has no 
opportunity to query and cross examine informants to determine reliability. 
The final problem identified by Murphy is that of measurement which is part and 
parcel of the general problem of measurement confronted by all social scientists. In 
the historian’s case, however, the problem is enormously complicated by the frag-
mentary nature of historical data and by the absence of data that bear upon the per-
ceptions, the attitudes, and the cognitive systems of historical individuals. To these 
problems a sixth, that of specification, can be added, although it is really subsumed 
under other categories. The simple fact is that historians frequently cannot ade-
quately specify models of historical processes or effectively test for spurious rela-
tions because appropriate data were either never collected or were not preserved. As 
                                                             
9  Murphey, Our Knowledge of the Historical Past, especially chapter 6. 
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a consequence, capacity to convincingly refute or support otherwise meaningful 
hypotheses is often sharply limited. 
Again, these problems could be stated in a variety of ways, and the preceding 
summary may do some violence to Murphey’s formulations. Even so it may serve 
to point the issues. We can note that Murphey’s formulations seem to reflect an un-
due preoccupation with research that focuses upon individuals. Research at a more 
macroscopic level may not confront these same problems, or, at least, not with the 
same severity. And, as Murphey points out, some of these problems may be amena-
ble to at least partial solution. Even at best, however, the critique is chastening. 
Clearly, a systematic history that pays due regard to problems of data, verification 
and inference cannot provide as rich or as fullsome a view of the past as is often 
pretended to through intuitive, empathetic and impressionistic approaches. It is 
clear as well that capacity to use the past as a source of evidence to test and con-
struct social theory is similarly limited. Perhaps the first lesson to be learned is one 
of limitations. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the limitations and fragmentary nature of 
historical data preclude, as has sometimes been argued, application of advanced and 
complex quantitative techniques. Indeed, quite the reverse is the case. The very in-
adequacies of historical data require more complex analytical techniques and more 
subtle and sophisticated applications than are required for more perfect and less ob-
streperous data. If anything, moreover, greater methodological expertise is probably 
required for fully effective research use of historical data than is required for much 
of the more perfect contemporary data employed by social scientists. 
Certainly the limitations of historical data dictate research in new areas. Meth-
odological research of the sort that Murphey suggests is obviously required. Areas 
in which methodological innovation is clearly needed are also obvious. They in-
clude techniques for sampling from incomplete records, for estimating missing data, 
and, most obviously, for estimating individual level relations from aggregated data. 
And here the picture is even more chastening. While the technical expertise of his-
torians has steadily risen in recent years, it is still, at least in the United States, low 
indeed compared with that of the related social sciences. Few historians are 
equipped to carry out methodological research or to solve methodological prob-
lems, and unfortunately, given the nature of training programs in the universities of 
the United States, opportunities and inducements to acquire necessary expertise are 
still by no means abundant. Thus, there is need for the development of alternative 
sources of training including that of a “retooling” nature. 
And more can be done to improve capacity to employ historical data and to fa-
cilitate better realization of the potentialities of the evidence of the past for the pur-
suit of social scientific goals. Accomplishment of these tasks would require that 
historians place greater value on prosaic but demanding activities that are now nei-
ther particularly well-regarded nor well-recognized in the distribution of profes-
sional rewards. Substantial efforts might usefully be directed to the development of 
systematic measures and indicators of social phenomena extending across long his-
torical periods. These tasks would involve more than data collection; rather they 
would require systematic evaluation of data sources and collection and combination 
of data to create estimates to measure and reflect substantive and theoretical con-
cepts. Examples of work of this sort include the historical economic indexes and 
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estimates developed by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the efforts of 
Walter Dean Burnham, and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research to create reliable estimates of mass electoral participation and behavior 
for the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as well as the 
systematic information on the characteristics of the international state system during 
the same period developed by J. David Singer and his associates. 
Indeed, a new form of historiography is needed, as Charles Tilly suggests in an-
other context, one that is concerned with the nature and properties of historical 
sources10. Much more can be learned of the structure of social bookkeeping systems 
of the past. If more was known of the functions of historical administrative systems, 
for example, improved capacity to estimate the kinds of biases and error that are 
likely to characterize the data which they gathered would be gained. Most historians 
have encountered shifts in time series which might signify change in production 
levels, in the incidence of violence, or in rates of voter participation but which 
might also reflect no more than change in recording procedures or in definitions or 
classification systems. Better knowledge of the operation of social bookkeeping 
systems might provide clues for the interpretation of such changes. And much the 
same can be said of information preservation. If more was known of the functions 
that information preservation was intended to serve in past situations, then histori-
ans might be better equipped to estimate the representative quality and the limita-
tions of surviving records. 
Inquiry of this sort would not be limited to the formal operation and functions of 
historical social bookkeeping systems. More could be learned of the operation of 
historical taxation systems and of the means by which the tax collector could be 
cheated. In this way, the error and bias characteristic of production and wealth sta-
tistics might be better diagnosed. We know that in the past, as in the present, it was 
sometimes to the interest of police and law enforcement agencies to maximize the 
reported incidence of crime and violence, and at other times minimization of that 
incidence was to their interest. Consideration of the nature of specific historical 
situations might allow better assessment of the direction, if not the magnitude, of 
the bias likely to be characteristic of statistics of crime and violence. 
Much more could be done in the way of source, or data, criticism. As an exam-
ple, two historians using what amounts to an extension of methods of internal criti-
cism have convincingly demonstrated the presence of substantial “biased undere-
numeration” in the data provided by the nineteenth century censuses of the United 
States11. Their work calls into question findings reported in a number of studies 
based on that source and is depressing in that respect. On the other hand, their work, 
and that of others, also provides grounds for optimism. At a minimum such efforts 
look toward identification of the categories of research that the censuses will and 
will not support. Thus these efforts look toward identification of limits. Obviously, 
if more can be learned of both the direction and magnitude of bias then pitfalls con-
fronted in the use of the source will be reduced or eliminated. And clearly, such ef-
forts can be extended to other categories of source materials. 
                                                             
10  Tilly, Quantification in History, pp. 110 passim. See also Narroll, Raoull, Data Quality 
Control, New York 1970. 
11  Sharpless, John B., and Shortridge, Ray M., Biased Underenumeration in Census Manu-
scripts: Methodological Implications, in: Journal of Urban History, 1 (August 1975). 
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More effective use of the evidence of the past would require, in other words, lar-
ger and more systematic investment of energy and talent in activities that are now 
often seen — quite wrongly — as preliminary and essentially ancillary to the actual 
research process. The requirement is not surprising for it has already been encoun-
tered in the other social sciences. Sample survey research is a case in point. What 
might be termed the technology of survey research has become an area of speciali-
zation, and a variety of subspecializations in aspects of that technology have ap-
peared which range from sample and instrument design through interviewing tech-
niques to data preparation, management and archiving. If the use of historical 
evidence in the pursuit of social scientific goals was taken seriously, appearance of 
analogous specializations and areas of specialized knowledge and activity related to 
historical source material might be anticipated, encouraged and rewarded. 
But these can be only partial remedies for the shortcomings of historical sources. 
Historical data that were never collected cannot be created; data that was once col-
lected but destroyed cannot be recreated. Even at best, the data of the past will re-
main incomplete and error ridden and critical variables will be lacking. The capac-
ity of social scientists to use the data of the historical past to develop scientific 
knowledge of human behavior will remain similarly limited. It may be worth re-
membering, however, that astronomers also study phenomena that are distant in 
both time and space. The data of astronomy are in some ways similar to those of 
history. The astronomer’s data is also a residue — the residual radiation from 
spacially and temporally distant stellar bodies that has penetrated to earth after 
countless filtering mechanisms have taken their toll. Astronomers have the advan-
tage of the laws of physics which allow diagnosis of the effects of those filters and 
which facilitate development of compensatory information. A system of social 
knowledge that equals physic in rigor and precision probably cannot be expected. 
Even so, an improved social science would increase the utility of historical evi-
dence for the pursuit of scientific knowledge of human affairs, and the study of the 
past can contribute to that improvement. 
The use of quantitative methods and materials by historians has already contrib-
uted to a more comprehensive and enriched view of the past. But if historians are to 
join in the quest for scientific knowledge of human affairs, the agenda of change 
remains long and crowded, and it leads “quite outside history”. Historians may not 
choose to abandon the goals of nineteenth century historiography, but even the ef-
fort to create a more valid and reliable view of the past requires further and more 
radical transformation of their craft than has yet occured. 
 
